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Abstract: The role of the small shareholder has been largely ignored in the literature, which 
has tended to concentrate on controlling shareholders and family ownership. And yet, focus 
on the importance of small shareholders can capture significant aspects of financial 
development, since the more 'confident' the minority shareholders, the easier will capital flow 
to firms. Pre 1970, debates and policy conflicts linked to stock exchange development 
concentrated on shareholder democracy and diffusion as key indicators. The number of 
shareholders relative to the population was seen as a critical factor in explaining not only 
structures in corporate finance but also political and economic preferences, market 
developments and overall economic development. This paper explores the so-called 
democratisation of investment and the factors behind it through the lens of trends in estimates 
of the UK and US shareholding populations between 1895 and 1970. It covers three key 
periods: before World War I, before and after the stock market crash of 1929, and post-World 
War II. It identifies three periods in the US when shareholder numbers were paramount: in the 
boom years of the 1920s, as part of the inquest into the 1929 Crash, and post-World War II in 
an attempt to boost stock market activity. In the UK, although some concern was expressed 
during the 1920s and 1930s at the passive nature of small investors, who held diversified 
portfolios with small amounts in each holding, it was the fear of nationalisation after World 
War II which led to more in-depth shareholder estimates. 
 
 
 
[Draft: February 2016, forthcoming in Enterprise and Society] 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is general agreement that the number of individual investors in financial 
securities grew on both sides of the Atlantic from the late nineteenth century onwards. 
This rise in the numbers of shareholders came to be called “people’s capitalism,” 
“shareholder democracy” and “democratisation of investment.”1 The term 
‘democratisation’ indicates diffusion of shareholdings and the rise in number of 
relatively small scale shareholders. The latter, the investors of 'moderate means' as 
Berle and Means put it many decades ago,2 have always been at the core of financial 
discussions. Nevertheless, research on the size of shareholder populations in the UK 
and the US has been fragmented, with little overall or comparative perspective.3
 Focus on the importance of small shareholders can capture significant aspects 
of financial development, since 'confident' minority investors are generally related 
with ease in capital raising by firms. Shifts in market participation rates are thus 
generally related to the number of listed firms and their size, the value of stock 
markets, and historical developments not only in corporate finance but also in the 
structure of stock exchange markets. This is why, before the 1970s, empirical research 
on financial development both in the UK and USA was mostly driven by attempts to 
quantify the extent of shareholder diffusion. In addition, empirical estimates of the 
extent of the 'democratisation of investment' were rooted in the debates and policy 
conflicts linked to the causes of stock exchange development.  
 
 The post-1980s-period has seen a dramatic growth in market capitalisations of 
stock markets in both more and less developed economies, while both shareholder and 
shareholding numbers are relatively well recorded.4
                                                 
1 For further discussion of this phenomenon in the US up to the 1929 Wall Street Crash, see Ott, When 
Wall Street. For discussion of the role of the New York Stock Exchange in encouraging small investors 
after World War II, see Traflet, A Nation. 
 In this financial landscape, the 
effort involved in estimating the extent of shareholder diffusion and democratisation 
may seem redundant in the context of financial debates. This was not the case in the 
past. Understanding the size and nature of the shareholder population was seen as a 
key issue in the rather heated topic of the drivers of stock exchange financial 
development. The number of shareholders relative to the overall population of a 
country is (and was perceived as) a critical factor in explaining not only structures in 
2 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation, 63-8. The focus in more recent financial studies has 
gradually moved onto controlling shareholders and family ownership; see, for example, Cheffins, 
Corporate Ownership; Foreman-Peck and Hannah, “Some Consequences”; Musacchio and Turner, 
“Does the Law”, Lipartito and Morii, “Rethinking.” 
3 Recent work by Julia Ott, When Wall Street met Main Street, on US shareholder democratisation in 
the 1920s and by Janice Traflet, A Nation of Small Shareholders, on shareholder democratisation post 
World War II, reflects increasing interest, in the US at least, on shareholder numbers rather than merely 
on controlling shareholders. 
4 Stock Exchanges, such as the Nigerian, Shanghai and London Stock Exchanges all produce Fact 
Books which include information on their shareholder populations. 
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corporate finance but also political and economic preferences, market developments, 
and overall economic activity and welfare economics.5
 This study offers a comprehensive review of the existing literature on the 
historical evolution of shareholder populations on both sides of the Atlantic from the 
end of the 19th century to 1970. The pulling together of available historical estimates 
of UK and US shareholder numbers, even though the estimates may only be 
approximations, allows us to identify significant differences in trends between the UK 
and the US over the period 1895 to 1970. Within the scope of this comparative study 
we also aim to highlight some important factors behind those trends not covered in the 
existing literature.
 
6
 In the UK, trends in share ownership, documented by Rutterford, Green, 
Owens and Maltby, have highlighted rising shareholder numbers from the 1870s to 
World War I, boosted by a growing financial press; a plethora of new issues; 
aggressive marketing by company promoters; extensive investor education; and 
access to a wide range of securities in both domestic and international concerns. 
Explanatory factors also include the development of diversified investment vehicles 
such as investment trusts, which blossomed in the UK from as early as the 1860s.
 Finally, this paper also explores what triggered the studies which 
produced these estimates of shareholder numbers, and how these estimates influenced 
the political and corporate governance debates of the day, such as those which 
followed in the wake of the Crash of 1929 in the US and after WWII in the UK. 
7 In 
the US, commentators became aware of significant growth in shareholder numbers 
during the 1920s, a decade which saw campaigns by companies to encourage 
employees and customers to invest in their securities and a boom in investment 
trusts.8
                                                 
5 For example, Roe “Legal Origins”, Musacchio and Turner, “Does the Law”, and Foreman-Peck and 
Hannah, “Some Consequences” discuss these issues. 
 Aggressive marketing campaigns in the 1920s and after World War II by 
brokerage firms and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) also helped to 
substantially boost US shareholder numbers, as did the promotion of investment trusts 
in the 1920s. In the UK by contrast, there were no major efforts to promote 
shareholder ‘democratisation’. Nor did the London Stock Exchange engage in 
6 Recent research, such as La Porta et al, “Legal Determinants”; La Porta et al. “Law and Finance”; and 
La Porta et al. “Economic Consequences”, has proposed common law origins and real GDP per capita 
as two standard explanatory variables of share ownership. However, the first factor, common law 
origins, is unable to capture the different democratisation patterns between the UK and the US as both 
countries had common law systems. At the same time, real income growth is not always a reliable 
indicator of market democratisation. For instance, while US real incomes were squeezed more than 
Britain’s in the 1930s, US share ownership continued to outstrip the UK’s, both in absolute terms and 
as a percentage of the population. The differing share ownership trajectories between the UK and the 
US which are identified in the paper cannot be explained by wealth and market movements alone. 
There is significant space for additional explanatory factors. 
7 Rutterford, “Learning from.” 
8 For example, Warshow’s attempt to measure shareholder numbers (“The Distribution”) dates from 
1924. 
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campaigns, as did the NYSE, to improve business for its broker members. It was not 
until the relatively low-key corporate-sponsored Wider Share Ownership campaign of 
the 1960s that, together with rising share prices, shareholder numbers increased. 
 Corporate, NYSE and member marketing strategies were behind a large part 
of US shareholder number growth, whereas the relative stagnation of UK shareholder 
numbers after 1914 can be explained by financial repression of government in terms 
of high taxation on investment income, capital and dividend controls, expropriation 
and nationalisation.9
 As well as exploring trajectories in shareholder numbers for the UK and the 
US, the paper also explores who the shareholders were, and whether the rhetoric of 
‘democratisation’ was reflected in shareholder registers. Both countries did 
experience some shift from wealthy to less wealthy investors, particularly in the early 
twentieth century, but the major change in both countries was the rising importance of 
women investors in the market, outnumbering men by the 1940s and 1950s, in at least 
some types of investment. Although these investors did not have sufficient 
shareholdings to control the companies in which they invested, their sheer numbers 
and the factors they took into account when making investment decisions influenced 
the financial and corporate governance strategies of companies on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
 The small shareholdings identified by commentators as evidence 
of the democratisation of capitalism in the UK can be attributed not to large numbers 
of individual investors but rather to fewer investors with more diversified portfolios, 
with the 'rentier' class retaining its grip on direct investment until selling out to 
investing institutions in the 1970s. 
 The remainder of the paper explores trends and factors in shareholder numbers 
in the UK and the US during three distinct periods: before WWI, between the wars, 
and after WWII. It also discusses some of the challenges in the measurement of 
shareholder populations and possible related biases, particularly in earlier estimates. 
Despite these limitations, the numbers do provide evidence of trends over time and 
possible comparisons between the US and the UK. 
 
2. Democratisation's first stage: pre-World War I 
 
After the Companies Acts of 1856 and 1862 which facilitated the setting up of limited 
liability companies, the early investor “was wealthy, tended to confine his 
investments to two or three companies and was interested to a certain degree in the 
running of these companies.”10
                                                 
9 For example, forced sale of overseas securities, particularly those denominated in US dollars, by UK 
investors during World War I. See Morgan and Thomas, The Stock Exchange, 221. 
 However, soon a wider potential pool of investors had 
10 Jefferys, Trends, 172-3. 
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access to information on potential investments. In Britain, from the railway boom of 
the 1840s onwards, investors could turn to newspapers or periodicals to have 
information on railway passenger numbers, reports of annual general meetings, new 
issue prospectuses and associated commentary. As the number of securities listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) increased, the number of financial periodicals 
grew – from 19 in 1874 to 109 in 1914 – boosted by cable communication, the growth 
in the number of limited liability companies and the increased demand for prospectus 
advertising.11 One new issue, in 1899, for preference shares and debenture stock in a 
Thames ship-building company, received comment from no less than 48 national and 
regional newspapers.12 But potential investors were not just targeted via the press. In 
1870, Chadwicks, a firm of accountants based in Manchester, began a monthly 
newsletter to prospective investors in envelopes marked “private and confidential” 
inviting “friends” to subscribe to the new issues discussed. By 1878, it is estimated 
that Chadwicks had 5,000 contacts.13
 Company promoters in the 1880s and 1890s were able to use the services of 
professional mailing services. The first British mail order firm, G. Smith Dalby-
Welch Limited, founded in 1868, listed 510,000 individual investors in Great Britain 
in its pamphlet, Finding the Buyer, published in 1911.
  
14 The company compiled and 
collated The Investors’ Register and was able to provide companies with lists of 
investors in different categories of companies, such as theatres and music halls or 
home railways. They were able to do this as companies were required to provide 
annual lists of shareholders to the Registrar of Companies and these were available 
for public inspection. The names on the shareholder lists represented the “modern 
investing public, its personnel numbered by hundreds of thousands, and representing 
every class of society except the absolutely destitute.”15
 As early as the 1890s, during a boom period for new issues, stock-broking 
firms were sending regular pamphlets and circulars to their clients, with suggestions 
of stocks and shares to buy.
 Also, by the early twentieth 
century, there were numerous financial pamphlets and books available to investors, 
with titles such as The Small Investor, Scientific Investment, How to Operate 
Successfully in Stocks, The Successful Investor, Everyone’s Guide to Investment 
Matters, and Women as Investors. 
16
                                                 
11 See Porter, “A Trusted Guide,” 1. These figures do not include the ‘bucket shop’ newspapers which 
had largely disappeared by the 1890s. Jefferys, Trends, 355. 
 For example, a broker’s circular was enthusiastic about 
a planned Guinness share placement, commenting: “the dividend should therefore not 
12 Press Cuttings File, Guildhall Library, MS19096. 
13 Jefferys, Trends, 318. 
14 London Guildhall, Pamphlet 21957. 
15 Powell, cited in Porter, “A Trusted Guide,” 1. 
16 Jefferys, Trends, 357. 
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be less than 18 per cent, for this year and the earnings should reach 24 per cent.”17 
Brokers were beginning to replace bankers and solicitors as the financial adviser of 
choice. And, by 1910, there were 19 stock exchanges in the United Kingdom and 
Ireland where investors could buy shares.18 Would-be small investors were also 
helped by the decline in partly-paid shares (removing the risk of further calls), the fall 
in the typical nominal value of each share to £5, £2 or even less, and the increased 
number of small “hand to mouth” issues of corporate fixed interest stocks and shares, 
such as preference shares and debenture stock.19 London stockbrokers Foster & 
Braithwaite made a good living by applying for new issues of fixed interest securities 
on behalf of their growing list of clients.20 The influence of the small investor could 
also be felt in the pricing of stocks that they favoured. Lowenfeld complained in 1907 
that, with the tube and omnibuses in London bringing in crowds from the suburbs, the 
shares of drapery stores and light-refreshment establishments had rocketed to yield 
less than could be obtained on first class brewery debentures.21
 In the United States, early common stock investors were primarily bankers and 
industrialists. It was not until after the merger boom of 1897 to 1904 that common 
stocks, and in particular preference shares were issued to fund the large corporations 
being formed, and began to be held by a broader spectrum of investors, albeit a 
relatively small number in total.
  
22 Individual investors tended to prefer relatively low 
risk investments - with bond and preference share issues outweighing common stock 
issues until the late 1920s. Also, the nominal value of most common stock issues 
remained relatively high at $100 – Pennsylvania Railroad was an exception at $50. In 
addition, US stocks were typically traded in lots of 100, with the “odd-lot” system 
catering, more expensively in relative terms, for smaller amounts.23 Margin accounts 
were only available for holdings of $1,000 or more, putting investing in shares out of 
reach of smaller investors.24
 As in the UK, there were investment newspapers, books and pamphlets, such 
as William Buck Dana’s Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Sereno Pratt’s 1903 
The Work of Wall Street and Edmund Stedman’s 1905 The New York Stock 
Exchange.
 
25
                                                 
17 Bailey, 2003, cited in Rutterford, “A History,” 123 
 Some, such as Henry Lowenfeld’s All about Investment (first edition 
1909), were made available in both London and New York. There were financial 
18 . Michie, “The London Stock Exchange,” 69. 
19 Lough, Business Finance 137. Cottrell, Industrial Finance, ch.4. 
20 Foster & Braithwaite, 1894-1910, Guildhall Library, MS14269. 
21 Lowenfeld, “The Investor’s Mind,” 21. 
22 Mary O’Sullivan, “Funding New Industries,” 168. Rutterford, “A History,” 118. Neal and Davis also 
argue that improved regulation and disclosure requirements by the NYSE attracted new investors at 
that time. See Neal and Davis, “Why did Finance Capitalism,” 140-3.  
23 Hannah, “Divorce,” 7. 
24 Smiley and Keen, “Margin Purchases,” 133. 
25 Traflet, A Nation, 144. 
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newspapers, with the Wall Street Journal founded in 1889 and Financial World 
founded in 1902, and familiarity with the stock market was enhanced by novels about 
speculation and investment, and by parlour games such as Bull and Bear, and 
Commerce.26
 The use of mailing lists did not flourish in the US, as share registers were – 
and are still not – in the public domain.
 
27 There was during the period no requirement 
such as that of the UK’s Companies Act 1867 for all limited companies to file an 
annual list of shareholders each year with the Registrar of Companies, within fourteen 
days of the annual general meeting.28 However, more informal lists of investors were 
established in the US: 24 regional stock exchanges allowed investors to invest in local 
banks, railroads and utilities from early in the nineteenth century.29 By World War I, 
retail dealers in these securities kept lists of individual investors interested in a 
specific type of security, such as mortgage bonds, insurance company securities or oil 
companies.30
 
 
2.1 Investor Characteristics 
 
Before World War I, for new, substantial bond issues – $100 million bond issues were 
not uncommon – US companies began to turn to relatively accessible groups of 
individual investors - customers and employees. The first customer ownership 
campaign recorded in the US was the Central Maine Power Company in 1908. 
Another example was the Pacific Gas and Electric Company which successfully sold 
its first issue of preference shares to customers. Emerson Drug Company gave away 
individual shares with a free sample of Bromo Seltzer when the company first floated. 
However, sales of stock to customers were still at an early stage by World War I; no 
more than 100,000 shares were sold by utility companies to customers before 1914. 
There was also a limited attempt to sell securities to employees. For example, United 
Drug Company, in March 1914, sent out a circular offering stock to employees. By 
                                                 
26 Sterling, Encyclopaedia of Journalism, 227. Robb, “Ladies of the Ticker,” 131, 137. 
27 There is still no blanket requirement in the US for shareholder lists to be available to the public, or 
even to shareholders, except in rare cases under individual state legislation or in two specific cases 
required by the SEC: tender offers and proxy solicitations. For further information on this, see the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website http://www.sec.gov/answers/sharehlist.htm 
(accessed on January 16, 2015). 
28 Lough, Business Finance, 37. My thanks to Leslie Hannah for pointing out that access to UK 
shareholder lists was standard from the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 onwards. 
29 The Exchanges were in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Colorado Springs, 
Columbus, Detroit, Hartford, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Louisville, New Orleans, Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh, Providence, Richmond, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Saint Louis, Seattle, Spokane, 
Washington and Wheeling. See Huebner, The Stock Market; Navin and Sears, “The Rise.” Wright 
“Reforming” cites more than 20,000 distinct individuals investing in Pennsylvanian banks and 23,000 
distinct individuals in Pennsylvanian turnpike and bridge companies as early as 1821.  
30 Lough, Business Finance, 316. 
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World War I, there were 53 companies with employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs) in the US.31
 Up to World War I, British management preferred profit-sharing schemes to 
employee share schemes. For example, by 1915, there were 98 profit-sharing schemes 
compared to 10 employee share schemes and a further 30 with a partial share 
element.
 
32 Existing shareholders, customers and suppliers were particularly easy to 
target by mailing and could also be useful in testing the waters for a potential capital 
raising exercise. For example, Claudius Ash, merchants and manufacturers of mineral 
teeth and dental materials, in a 1913 prospectus for £50,000 each of 5 ½% preference 
shares and ordinary shares, stated that they would allot preferentially to existing 
shareholders and to members of the dental profession. In the UK, the Chairman of 
Spratts Patent, at the 17th Annual General Meeting in 1903, commented on the fact 
that a considerable portion of the shareholders were trade customers, who readily 
subscribed to the new preference issue as soon as it was made.33
 In Britain, the gas industry was the most active sector targeting employees and 
customers, well before its US counterparts: eight such schemes were set up before 
1880. 
 
34 Dr Carpenter, Chairman of the South Metropolitan Gas Company, in 
evidence to the 1918 Select Committee on Gas Undertakings, stated that they reserved 
a certain proportion of new issues for employees, but employees had to pay the 
market price to obtain these shares.35 However, the South Metropolitan Gas Company 
also specifically targeted customers. “In the early days of the gas industry, and for 
many years afterwards, stock was held by comparatively few people. We felt, 
however, that it would be an advantage to our business if we could induce our 
customers, to whom we are necessarily bound in a somewhat different manner from 
the ordinary commercial undertaking, to take shares in our business; and with 
whatever new issues of stock we made during the last five-and-twenty or thirty years, 
we took care to give facilities for the purchase of smaller quantities, and to see that 
these facilities were brought under the eyes of the small investor. That policy proved 
very successful.”36
 Observers on both sides of the Atlantic also noted, although only anecdotally, 
the growing importance of women in their share registers. In both countries, spinsters 
and widows had long had the same property rights as men, and married women 
acquired individual property rights through nineteenth century legislation. By 1865, in 
 
                                                 
31 “Employee Stock Purchase Plans,” 12, FN4. Lough, Business Finance, 295. Sears, The New Place, 
48. Means, “Diffusion,” 567. 
32 Report on Profit-Sharing, 166. 
33 Letter from George Trollope to Sir Everard Hambro, 5 February 1903, Guildhall, MS19097. 
Applications for listing, MS18000/Claudius Ash. The Economist, March 14 1903, 477. 
34 Report on Profit-Sharing, 166. 
35 Report on Profit-Sharing, 20. 
36 Ibid, 21. 
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the US, 29 states had Married Women’s Property Acts on their statute books; in the 
UK, there were two Married Women’s Property Acts, in 1870 and 1882.37 In the US, 
Lough commented in 1914 that, for both New Haven Railroad and Pennsylvania 
Railroad, women represented almost half the shareholder base.38 In the UK, the 
Chairman of Spratts Patent, at the 1903 annual general meeting, noted that of the 
1,482 shareholders there were 585 “ladies, who were generally investors and who 
were therefore, as a rule, preferable to those who bought the shares merely as a 
speculation.”39 Women also attended annual general meetings and were not afraid of 
asking critical questions about the share price or dividend performance. “It is said that 
where women are serious investors, they are generally conscientious shareholders, 
attending the meetings of companies in which they are interested, taking intelligent 
interest in reports, and faithful in using their votes.” 40
 Indeed, the Americans were impressed by British annual general meetings in 
general. In comparison, America’s (and the world’s) largest quoted corporation in 
1899, Standard Oil, had less than 100 attending its annual general meeting.
 
41
 
 The 
Wall Street Journal commented on the fact that British stockholders’ meetings were 
often held in London “in a hall that accommodates two thousand people and it is 
frequently crowded. There is always a good attendance. The questions are shrewd and 
searching, and woe betide the director who tries to evade them.”  
2.2 Shareholder numbers 
 
By the early twentieth century, observers of the stock market were noting a rise in the 
number of US and UK shareholders. For example, reporting on a Wall Street Journal 
survey of American stockholders in 1901, 1906 and 1910, The Economist noted an 
increase between 1901 and 1910 of 175%, or 125% if allowance were made for new 
companies and capitalisation increases. The consensus that “[c]apital has to a great 
extent been democratised” on both sides of the Atlantic increased awareness of the 
spread of shareholding and led to the first tentative estimates of how many there 
were.42
                                                 
37 Robertson and Yohn, “Women and Money: the United States,” 218-9. Rutterford and Maltby, “The 
Widow.” 
 However, in the US, overall shareholder numbers attracted less popular 
attention than the concentration of ownership among the “robber barons” before 1914 
38 Lough, Corporation Finance, 37. 
39 The Economist, March 14 1903, 477. The greater predilection by male investors compared to female 
investors to speculate still persists today. See, for example, Barber and O’Dean, “Boys Will Be Boys.” 
40 Cited in Sears, The New Place, 150. The Economist, March 14 1903. Creighton, “Women and 
Finance.” For further discussion of annual general meetings in the US and the UK 1890 to 1970, see 
Rutterford, “The Shareholder Voice.” 
41 Hannah, “Divorce,” 418. 
42 The Economist, August 19 1911, 374. 
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and, in any case, shareholder registers for companies in non-regulated sectors were 
mostly unavailable to would-be researchers. Hawkins’ later estimate of half a million 
quoted company shareholders in 1900 and two million by 1920 (a rise from 0.7% to 
1.9% of the population) is unsubstantiated.43
 Shareholder numbers in the UK showed rapid growth from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards. Contemporary government surveys found that shareholders in UK 
railways numbered 170,000 (0.6% of the population) in 1855 and 640,824 (1.5%) in 
1902. Shareholders in quoted domestic banks numbered 81,577 in 1850 and around 
260,000 in 1911 (an increase from 0.1% to 0.6% of the population). Writing in 1938, 
Clapham estimated that, by 1914, there were 900,000 railway shareholders and 
300,000 bank shareholders, arguing that the total number of shareholders was close to 
1.3 million or 2.8% of the population.
 
44
 Company directors did, though, note their significant shareholder numbers. J. 
P. Coats had 25,000 shareholders as early as 1896 and, at the first annual general 
meeting of Lipton, the tea company, floated on the stock market in 1888, the 
Chairman announced that there had been an enormous number of applications for 
shares, “as evidenced by the fact that there are now 74,000 shareholders.” He believed 
“that this was the largest number of shareholders of any British industrial 
company.”
 However, there were no contemporary 
estimates of shareholder numbers in the UK. 
45
 Another aspect of the diffusion of shareholding can be viewed as the number 
of companies with large numbers of shareholders. For example, looking at US 
company shareholdings in 1900, Hannah finds that of the 50 large non-railway 
corporations for which he could obtain shareholder details, only one – American 
Sugar – had more than 10,000 stockholders in total – 9,800 common shareholders and 
9,200 preference shareholders. Not even AT&T came into that category, having only 
7,535. Only four railroad companies – Pennsylvania, New York Central, Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe, Union Pacific – and no banks had more than 10,000 
shareholders.
 
46 In comparison, Hannah estimates that for the UK circa 1900, in 
addition to large industrial and commercial companies, four British banks and ten 
British railway companies already had more than 10,000 shareholders.47
                                                 
43 Hawkins, “Development”, 145. 
 However, by 
44 Cited in Michie, The London and New York Stock Exchanges, 118, footnote 67. Hannah, “Divorce,” 
408. 
45 The Economist, June 4 1888, 847. In fact, the company with the largest number of shareholders in 
1900 was a quasi-political foundation established by the Second Zionist Congress in Basel in 1898 
which, the following year, attracted more than 100,000 extremely small, subscriptions to its London-
registered Judische Colonialbank Limited, the Jewish Colonial Trust, which financed Jewish 
resettlement in Palestine. Rutterford et al “Researching Shareholding,” 177. 
46 Warshow, “The Distribution”; Cox, “Trends”; Means, “The Diffusion,” 561-600; Hannah, 
“Divorce,” 408-412. 
47 Hannah, “Divorce,” 412. 
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1913, US corporations with more than 10,000 shareholders included General Electric, 
United States Steel Corporation, and AT&T.48 Lough, writing in 1914, commented 
that AT&T then had more than 25,000 shareholders, Penn Railroad over 60,000, and 
United States Steel almost 110,000 shareholders.49
 Despite the rapid growth in large shareholder registers in the US compared 
with the UK, the UK maintained a wider spread of companies with relatively large 
shareholder numbers. For example, Foreman-Peck’s and Hannah's analysis of 337 
British companies with share capital of £1m or more listed in the 1911 edition of The 
Four Shilling Investor Handbook showed an average of 6,166 holders per company, 
with a total number of shareholders of 2,081,790. Lough’s 1913 survey of a similar 
number of 327 US quoted companies found only 1,251,468 shareholders, a smaller 
average of 3,827 per company.
  
50
 Focusing on the total number of individual ordinary and preference 
shareholders in US corporations before World War I, Warshow, the corporate 
treasurer of National Lead, using a sample of 68 companies for which he had 
shareholder data from 1900 through to 1923, and extrapolating to the population of all 
public corporations – listed or not – which filed capital-stock tax returns (a total of 
326,100 in 1923), estimated 4.4 million stockholders in 1900, 7.4 million in 1910, 7.5 
million in 1913, 8.6 million in 1917 and 12.0 million in 1920. The results are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
[TABLE 1 NEAR HERE] 
 
 Warshow used a method later followed by Berle and Means, as well as 
Bernheim and Schneider. The method involved dividing IRS statistics on aggregate 
corporate share capital at par by sampled average shareholdings of a group of 
corporations (68 in 1900 to 281 in 1923) assuming $100 nominal share values for all 
shares. As Warshow himself acknowledged, his sample was of larger than average 
corporations and, since he believed that larger corporations had smaller average size 
of holdings, this might have introduced an upward bias in his shareholding estimates. 
Second, the method used for estimating total capital stock in all corporations was 
probably accurate for 1923, but may have understated shareholdings in previous years 
as he estimated total capital stock for earlier years by extrapolating backwards from 
the 1923 total capital stock estimate, using new issue data for the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) only.51
                                                 
48 Means, “Diffusion,” 594. 
 Also, Warshow’s calculations of the number of 
49 Lough, Corporation Finance, 7. 
50 Foreman-Peck and Hannah, “Extreme Divorce”, 1224; Lough, Corporation Finance,37. 
51 Warshow, “The Distribution”, 27. 
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shareholdings in any one year were for all corporations; and in 1914, for example, 
about half of the capital was in closed corporations. So Warshow’s estimate is an 
overestimate of those shareholdings in publicly quoted securities.52
 Such estimates of total shareholder numbers are problematic, partly due to 
which population of companies is being sampled and partly to how the sample relates 
to the population. For example, the Lough, Foreman-Peck and Hannah, and Clapham 
figures relate to subsamples of publicly quoted companies, whereas the Warshow 
estimates relate to all corporations, whether publicly quoted or not. Most observers 
were interested in publicly quoted companies and so we will concentrate on such 
estimates. Another major issue relates to the confusion between shareholdings and 
shareholders. The estimates provided above by Lough, Clapham, Foreman-Peck and 
Hannah and Warshow are of shareholdings, rather than shareholders, as investors 
typically hold more than one security in their portfolios. Estimating total shareholder 
numbers therefore requires an estimate of the average number of holdings per 
portfolio as well as the number of shareholdings.  
 
 Foreman-Peck and Hannah, extrapolating from the data in their sample of 337 
quoted companies in 1911, which contain a total of 2,081,790 shareholdings, assume 
that there were a further 150% of shareholdings in the many other thousands of 
quoted UK companies, making a total of 5 million shareholdings overall . In order to 
estimate the number of shareholders rather than shareholdings, this shareholding 
estimate should be divided by the average number of shares held per investor. 
Rutterford has estimated that the average number of such holdings was 4.5 for a 
sample of 508 decedents between 1870 and 1902.53
 The estimate of 4.5 holdings per portfolio in the early twentieth century does 
not necessarily apply to the US for a number of reasons. The US had, on average, 
higher par value shares than the UK − the UK had many at £1 ($5) and £10 ($50) − 
and investors also had larger average holdings than their UK counterparts. For 
example, the average nominal shareholding in Warshow’s 68 companies sampled in 
1913 was $10,199 (down from $16,387 in 1900), comparable with a sample of 327 
companies by Lough who noted a decline in average shareholding from $22,000 in 
1900 to $8,500 in 1913. These average shareholdings are substantially higher than 
Foreman-Peck and Hannah’s £912 ($4,432) for their sample of 337 UK-listed 
companies in 1911.
 Using this figure gives an 
estimate of 1.1 million shareholders in the UK in 1911, or 2.4% of the population.  
54
                                                 
52 Cox, Trends, 20-1; Hannah, “Global Corporations in 1910.” 
 Similarly, Rutterford, Green, Owen and Maltby, in a survey of 
53 Rutterford and Sotiropoulos, “How Performative”, Table 3. 
54 Comparing only railway stocks, Foreman-Peck and Hannah include 36 in their sample of 337 
companies, with an average shareholding size for these companies of £1,330 ($6,450) for 1911. 
Warshow includes 13 railway companies in his 1913 sample of 68 companies, with an average holding 
size of $10,983. The average size of shareholding for all US railroads in 1914 was $13,958. See 
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223 UK share registers of 47 companies over the period 1870 to 1935, found average 
shareholdings peaked in the decade of the 1890s at £1,446 ($7,070), falling to £1,106 
($5,386) for the 1900s and £689 ($3,280) for the 1910s.55 There is evidence that 
British investors and their advisers well understood the modern principles of portfolio 
diversification before 191456 and LSE investors had more choice than NYSE 
investors.57
If we return to Warshow’s shareholding estimates for pre-World War I, and exclude 
shareholdings in closed corporations by using Moody’s estimate for the par value of 
all US quoted securities in 1907, and an assumed shareholding nominal value of 
$9,500 (between Warshow’s 1900 and 1913 estimates), we obtain an estimate for 
1907 of 2,431,579 US shareholdings. Dividing by 3 gives 810,526 stockholders or 
0.9% of the US population. If the divisor used were 4.5, the estimated number of 
stockholders in the US in 1907 would be smaller at 540,351 or 0.6% of the 
population.
 There is thus an argument for assuming a lower average number of 
holdings for US investors compared to the 4.5 estimate above for UK investors. For 
comparative purposes, we assume 3 holdings per US portfolio.  
58
 
 See the first part of Table 2 for a summary of the main estimates of 
shareholder numbers pre-World War I.  
[TABLE 2 NEAR HERE] 
 
 Thus Ott’s suggestion that there were fewer stockholders in the US before 
1914 than the 300,000-350,000 bondholders is implausible.59 Even so, our higher 
estimate for the US shareholder population in1907 is barely half the UK level at the 
turn of the century and about a third of Clapham’s (upper bound) UK estimate for 
1914. In one respect it clearly exaggerates domestic shareholder numbers in that it 
counts all stocks of US quoted companies listed by Moody as held by Americans, 
while we know that many were held abroad.60
                                                                                                                                            
Foreman-Peck and Hannah, “Extreme Divorce”; Warshow, “The Distribution”; Bureau of Railway 
Economics, “Number of Stockholders.” 
 Growth was rapid after the 1907 
recession, so it is likely that the number of shareholders in quoted US companies by 
55 Rutterford et al., “Who comprised.” 
56 Lowenfeld Investment an Exact Science; Goetzmann and Ukhov, “British Investment.” Rutterford 
and Sotiropoulos, “How Performative”. Investment trusts, which held portfolios of bonds, issued shares 
to the public promoting the benefits of diversification as early as 1968. See note 12: Rutterford, 
“Learning from.” 
57 Domestic railways accounted for most corporate securities on the NYSE until the 1920s, but were 
already a minority on the LSE by the 1890s; the number of companies traded on the LSE exceeded 
those on the NYSE for most of the first half of the twentieth century, and the LSE consistently offered 
more opportunity for international diversification. 
58 Moody’s Manual, 1907. 
59 Ott, When Wall Street, pp. 52-3, 57 n.4.  
60 We do not know what proportion of the approximately $7b. that foreigners had invested in the US in 
1914 was portfolio (rather than direct) investment (though it was more than half), nor what proportion 
of that was in stock rather than bonds (though much was in bonds), see Wilkins, History, 144-174. 
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1914 had increased, possibly to above a million (thus perhaps equalling UK 
shareholder numbers in absolute terms) but this would still have constituted only 1% 
of the US population, and includes foreign holders of US stocks. 
Despite the approximations inherent in the above estimates, they point to the UK 
having more shareholders as a percentage of the population than did the US before 
World War I. UK investors also had, on average, smaller shareholdings and more 
holdings per portfolio than did their US counterparts. Only a limited number of US 
companies, although many were of substantial size, had over 10,000 shareholders. As 
Lough commented, in 1914, in England “stock is on the whole more widely scattered 
and held in smaller lots than in this country.”61
 A number of factors can explain this difference. One is the greater choice 
available to British investors of both domestic and foreign company shares and 
another the earlier British use of sophisticated marketing techniques to reach potential 
investors. One additional reason for the difference may be the greater per capital 
accumulated from past savings of the British compared to the Americans pre World 
War I. Neymarck, for example, calculated that in 1912 the British and French had 
each accumulated twice the level of transferable securities per head possessed by 
Americans.
 
62
 
 
3. Between the Wars 
 
The sale of war savings certificates and government bonds during the First World 
War boosted the 'savings' culture among the population and taught them how to think 
as investors. The sheer size of the finance needed had led to advertising and publicity 
being used on a hitherto unprecedented scale to access the savings of the entire 
population: men and women, girls and boys, young and old, rich and poor, workers 
and those at leisure, to save as much as they could in the national interest. In Britain, 
by 1919 there were over 40,000 war savings associations, in workplaces, schools and 
post offices with a weekly subscribing membership of over 7 million people. 140 
million certificates were sold between 1916 and 1918. In the United States, the US 
Treasury Department’s War Loan Organization was responsible for the sale of Liberty 
bonds, Victory bonds, and War Savings stamps and certificates. A total of 21 million 
subscribed to the four Liberty Loans, with 85% investing sums of $50 or $100. A 
further 1 billion War Savings Certificates were sold. Women on both sides of the 
Atlantic were asked to think of themselves as Joan of Arc, as in the advertising 
posters aimed at American and British women shown in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
61 Lough, Corporation Finance, 81. 
62 Neymarck, “La Statistique”. 
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[FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE] 
 
 This need for finance did not stop in 1918. Americans were then encouraged 
to “save and invest in restoring Europe to health.”63 In Britain, the War Savings 
Committee’s work was maintained to “teach and induce people to save who never 
saved before.” Advertising campaigns played on patriotic fervour. By June 1929, a 
total of 908 million certificates had been sold in Britain, representing a cash 
investment of £720 million.64 In doing their patriotic duty, on both sides of the 
Atlantic, these new investors were viewed very differently from the previous hate 
figures − the “bloated” American and the “insatiable” British bondholders.65
 In Britain, Powell, writing in 1920, contrasted the large holdings of a handful 
of individuals in the share register of the Alamillos Company in 1864 with the much 
smaller and more numerous individual holdings in 1920s share registers for Liptons, 
Harrods or Selfridge’s.
 These 
terms derived from a perception in the US that stock market was for speculation rather 
than investment, and in the UK, from descriptions of rentiers, penalised fiscally in the 
1909 so-called “People’s Budget.” 
66 In Powell’s study of change over more than 50 years he 
noted that , in the Selfridge’s department store share registers, the most recent 
investors included: “a cabinet maker, a gas collector, a clerk, a nurse, a housekeeper, a 
school mistress, and a housekeeper.” As evidenced by this list, it was recognised that 
women investors “of all classes” were now saving and investing as they “consolidated 
for themselves well-paid occupations in quite a number of walks of life to which in 
earlier times they were strangers.” Women had also been educated to invest through 
the war loan prospectuses which had been “simply and clearly written, with many 
women receiving their first lesson in investment from these prospectuses.” 67 In the 
US, Sears, referring to a National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) analysis of the 
top 9 occupations of buyers of more than 50 of a utility’s 7% preferred stock, noted 
that housewives were by far the largest of these occupational categories, numbering 
3,347 out of 7,088.68
 But there was a major difference between the UK and the US in the interwar 
years. British investors were not targeted by companies nor by brokers, as in the US, 
and this difference had a major impact on relative shareholder numbers. Sears, 
commenting on a 1 million growth in shareholder numbers in the five years to 1928, 
 
                                                 
63 Meeker, The Work, 118-9. 
64 Fraser, Women and War Work, 1918. Cited in Rutterford and Maltby, “That Wide-Eyed Sceptical 
Curiosity,” 10. 
65 Meeker, The Work, 118-119. The Economist, July 12 1919, 42.  
66 Ott, “From ‘New Proprietorship,” 1-10; Powell, “The Democratisation,” 243-4. 
67 Wright, “The State,” 34. Greig and Gibson, “Women and Investment,” 176. 
68 Sears, The New Place, 60. 
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attributed this to increased interest in investment, the desire to hold shares 
beneficially, and to customer and employees being targeted as potential investors.69
 
 
3.1 Customers and Employees 
 
US companies were keen to spread share ownership more widely after World War I to 
counter growing trade union power. American utilities in particular were under 
pressure: for example, AT&T was threatened with nationalisation; and electric 
utilities needed support to maintain monopolies and were particularly keen to keep 
funding costs low as the rates of return they could earn were regulated. By directly 
targeting customers, they could save on intermediaries’ commissions. Employee 
shares were also viewed as a less dependent approach to providing for old age than 
were pensions.70 In addition, managers worried that heavy surtaxes imposed 
particularly by the Revenue Act of 1917 on “rich men” might have “dimmed their 
appetite for further investment in stocks and bonds.” This was particularly the case in 
the US where it was possible to invest in tax-exempt bonds, real estate and insurance. 
Tax exempt securities totalled $4.1 billion at the end of 1921 and $12.3 billion at the 
end of 1923. The sheer number of employees and customers of the new giant 
corporations was a tempting market for capital raisers, and the old “soulless” image of 
the corporation had been dispelled through familiarity. By 1923, for example, over 
half of all American employees worked for firms with more than 250 employees.71
 Techniques applied to the selling of War Loan were transferred to AT&T 
when the Treasury secretary, David Houston, resigned to join AT&T’s share 
distribution subsidiary in 1921.
 
72
 
 AT&T employees were targeted, not only to buy 
shares on their own account, but also to sell to customers. It was felt that customers 
would be happier to see high profits if they felt they were participating through high 
dividends. 
The telephone employee who assists his friend in acquiring the stock is not only 
helping to strengthen the credit of the company, but he is aiding his friend to become 
an investor in a security which is one of the soundest in the market. He is promoting 
thrift and the habit of safe investment. He is making friends for himself and for his 
company, and, in reality, is helping to make this country of ours a better one.73
 
 
                                                 
69 Sears, The New Place, 35-6. 
70 Employee Stock Purchase Plans, 169. 
71 Harris, “The Diffusion,” 379. Means, “Diffusion,” 586. Employee Stock Purchase Plans, 4. 
72 Ott, “New Proprietorship,” 8-9. 
73 The marketing system for employees and customers is well described in Devereux, “The 
Development,” 63-9. 
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AT&T proudly advertised the large number of small shareholders in the firm as early 
as 1910: “35,510 out of 35,823 hold less than $1,000 each.”74
 Other company executives soon followed suit. For example, New York 
Central Railroad in January 1925 offered 35,000 shares to employees at a price of 
$110, ten dollars less than the market price. 68,000 shares were allotted (out of 97,000 
subscribed for) and subscriptions for small numbers of shares were favoured. This had 
the impact of increasing the number of shareholders at one fell swoop from 36,500 in 
January to 78,000 by April 1925. In an even more spectacular fashion, the number of 
AT&T stockholders rose from 60,000 in 1914 to 139,448 in 1920 and 469,801 by 
1929, an average annual growth rate for the 1920s of 37.4%. The number of new 
employee share ownership plans in the United States between 1919 and 1927 
averaged 33 a year, and, allowing for 89 earlier schemes, reaching a total of 386 by 
1929.
 
75
 For employees, partial payment plans and investment support groups similar 
to those for war savings societies were common. Employee share schemes also 
involved some kind of benefit over and above that available to the normal investor, 
typically a small discount on the purchase price. This helped to overcome labour 
opposition. In 80 offerings made between 1925 and 1929, the median discount was 4 
points lower than the market price, with 36 firms, including AT&T offering more than 
4 points discount.
 
76 The number of stock sales to customers by public utilities also 
grew rapidly with 251 new customer plans adopted between 1914 and 1929. By 1929, 
the National Electric Light Association promoted the fact that it had more than 1 ½ 
million customer owners in 230 utility companies.77
 Women became an important element in marketing to both employees and 
customers. AT&T used its mostly female telephone operators to sell to customers they 
spoke to. By 1920, AT&T was proudly boasting that it had more women shareholders 
than men.
 
78 Companies used the image of the female shareholder, often depicted as 
old and helpless, to good effect. “A company is known by the shareholders it 
keeps.”79
 
 Companies often included the number of shareholders in their marketing 
material. 
Who is Swift & Company? Swift & Company is not a one-man or one-family affair. 
It is a company owned by more than 40,000 people scattered over the face of the 
globe… Thirteen thousand of them are women. Nearly fourteen thousand of them are 
                                                 
74 The Economist, 2 April 1910. 
75 Harris, “The Diffusion,”, 25-8. Ott, “From ‘New Proprietorship’,” 11. 
76 Ott, “From ‘New Proprietorship’,” 21. Davis, Employee Stock Ownership and the Depression, 10-11. 
77 Means, “Diffusion,” 593–6. 
78 The Times, 8 April 1921, 16. 
79 Ott, “New Proprietorship,” 13. 
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employees. The average individual holdings are small – about thirty seven shares 
apiece. These shareholders are the men and women… jealous of the character and 
reputation of their organization, proud of what it is doing, proud to have a part in 
supplying to the world such products as Swift’s Premium Ham and Bacon, Brookfield 
Sausage, Silverleaf Brand Pure Lard, Wool Soap, Swift & Company’s fresh meats 
etc. 
 
The coincidence of stock ownership with consumption opened up new vistas of 
advertising, as shareholders were encouraged to buy their company’s products and to 
act as advertisers to friends and acquaintances. So the “customer owner” became the 
“owner customer.”80
 
 Thus, companies were beginning to realise that, not only did 
customers allow them to reduce their cost of finance, but also gave them access to a 
captive audience to whom to sell their products. Taking this a step further, some 
companies realised that women shareholders were a positive bonus. Warshow, in his 
analysis of shareholder numbers from 1900 to 1923, quotes from a letter from the 
Secretary of the National Biscuit Company in 1924: 
There is only one class of stockholder we are really interested in keeping track of and 
that is, the number of women stockholders, as they are the real purchasers of this 
company’s product. On December 31, 1923, we had 7,283 women stockholders; 
virtually 50 per cent of the number of stockholders of the company are women. We 
have not tabulated the number of shares of stock being held by them; the only thing 
we are really interested in is to note the constant increase in the number of women 
stockholders. On January 1, 1914, we had but 4,140 women stockholders, so you can 
see there has been a handsome increase in nine years in the number of women 
stockholders.81
 
 
By 1929, Good Housekeeping had taken this on board. 
 
The woman shareholder should be given prominence in the classification for some 
companies, particularly corporations dealing in household products, food stuffs, and 
clothing, where such companies desire to develop the stockholder-customer idea. 
 
The woman of today is a shareholder in the well-managed industries that supply the 
wants of American life and the needs of her family. Today any director of any great 
company will tell you what a large shareholder she is. Also Good Housekeeping’s 
                                                 
80 Sears, The New Place, 44. 
81 Letter from G.P. Wells, Secretary, to H.T. Warshow, February 29, 1924, cited in H. T. Warshow, 
“The Distribution,” 33, footnote 2.  
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Editor can show you thousands of letters from women with substantial means who 
ask advice about their investments.82
 
 
In the UK, after World War I, companies were also under pressure to respond to 
labour unrest but were less willing to set up subsidised employee share ownership 
schemes. A comprehensive survey of employee profit-sharing, co-partnerships and 
employee share schemes was commissioned by the British government and the 
resulting report on Profit-Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in the United Kingdom 
was published in 1920. It detailed 182 existing profit-sharing or co-partnership 
schemes of which 41 involved some form of employee share ownership (including 12 
gas company schemes), with 29 new profit-sharing schemes, including 5 employee 
share schemes set up in 1919 alone.83
 At the 1920 Annual General Meeting of the Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal 
Company, a “lady shareholder,” Mrs Thompson-Price, put to the Chairman the 
possibility of the company starting an employee share ownership scheme: 
  
 
Probably you are aware, as I am myself, that quite a large number of companies − 
some of them new companies – have during the last year or two arranged for their 
employees to be paid a certain commission upon their earnings, such commission to 
be translated at the end of the year into shareholdings, and I think that in some cases 
the Board or a number of gentlemen who are trustees hold those shares for employees 
and pay them a certain amount of dividend thereon, to be arranged, of course, by the 
directors. 
 
The Chairman replied that “anything worth having is worth paying for” and that 
employees “like everyone else” should buy shares at market price and take their 
chance.84
                                                 
82 Sears, The New Place, 61-62. 
 The Chairman of J Lyons & Co., which owned a chain of restaurants, felt 
obliged at the 1920 Annual General Meeting to dismiss press comment that waitresses 
were inadequately paid, and countered “agitators” claims’ that the shareholder return 
on capital was too high at 47.5% by saying that it averaged out at a mere 9.4% or 
5.4% after tax. All he could come up with to appease public opinion on the capital/ 
labour divide was to announce that both shareholders and staff would be given the 
same “favourable consideration” if they wanted to apply for the forthcoming issue of 
preference shares. For firms such as these, no employee shares were offered at a 
discount. Some employee share schemes were launched after World War I, perhaps in 
83 Report on Profit-Sharing, iii, 166. A total of 180 schemes were started in the period up to 1919 but 
only 182 had survived. There were 36 schemes dating from prior to 1901. The main periods in which 
such schemes were initiated were 1888-92, 1908-9 and 1912-14. Maltby et al., “The Evidemce,” 192-3. 
84 The Economist, June 19 1920, 1354-5. 
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reaction to the increase in the number of trade union members from two to five 
million between 1911 to 1919. In 1930, the Ministry of Labour noted 187,000 
workers in share-issuing companies but only 37,000 participating in the schemes, with 
“only a minority of the employees… able, or have wished, to take advantage of the 
facilities offered.”85
 The J. Lyons Chairman’s comments about labour and capital were typical of 
speeches at many UK Annual General Meetings, in particular after a higher rate of 
income tax was charged on unearned rather than earned income from 1907. The 
Chairman of Pearson and Knowles Iron Coal and Iron Company felt he spoke for 
many: “How about £631,186 of wages and £24,400 dividend? This is our own 
instance as you know and we represent many like companies” (Hear, Hear).
 
86 
However, Shell Transport and Trading, as early as 1902, made a small concession by 
changing its shares from £100 to £1 nominal value to encourage the entry of “many 
agents and servants” of the company onto the share register, with the splitting of the 
shares allowing placing the shares within reach of “men of moderate means.” This 
was not pure altruism. The Chairman revealed that the key reason for requiring a 
larger shareholder base was that the company was constantly having to appeal to the 
government for facilities and protection around the world, and the larger the body of 
shareholders, the stronger its negotiating position.87
 The antipathy between labour and capital increased after World War I, with 
higher tax rates, as evidenced by the J. Lyons case above, causing resentment. Since 
income tax was deducted before the dividend was paid, many investors did not 
understand why they were suffering so. Mrs Ada Gurrin wrote in 1919 to the 
Secretary of the Prudential Assurance Company: “Is there any chance of getting my 
pre-war dividend? … I think your Board should remember that the shares are very 
carefully held by people with fixed incomes like myself.” Two years later, in 1921, 
she was openly complaining about how labour as well as capital should share the 
pain: “As one of the shareholders in your company I am writing to ask you to consider 
US in this new financial year… as the staff in other firms has to have its salary 
reduced now food is cheaper why not y[ou]rs, is it fair that long suffering 
shareholders should go on with a depleted income?.”
  
88
                                                 
85 Cited in Maltby et al., “The Evidence,” 193. 
 This is in line with Cheffins’ 
argument that one of the causes of an increase in shareholder numbers was the 
86 Report of Annual General Meeting, The Economist, 30 September 1911, 666. 
87 Report of the Annual General Meeting of Shell Transport & Trading, the Economist, 25 January 
1902, 19-20. 
88 Letters dated 7 February 1919 and December 10 1921 from Mrs Ada Gurrin to the Secretary of the 
Prudential Assurance Company, The Prudential Archive, Shareholders’ correspondence file, 1915-
1924. In fact many women with a small income did not realise that they could claim the income tax 
back. See letter to The Times from Mr W. G. Scoty, August 10 1923. 
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disposal of large holdings by wealth investors subject to high income tax rates on their 
investment income.89
 It is worth remembering that a capital levy on wealth of more than £1,000 was 
in the Labour Party manifesto for both 1919 and 1923 elections, with much concern 
as to how to reduce the disparities in income and particularly wealth exercising the 
minds of politicians throughout the 1920s.
 
90. It was feared that issuing too many 
shares to employees would lead to “over capitalisation” and to too much voting power 
being transferred to employees.91 To counter these risks, those shares which were 
issued to employees were limited in number or given as quasi shares. Indeed, only one 
company in the 1920 Report of the Committee on Profit-Sharing and Labour Co-
Partnership allowed employee shareholders to attend the annual general meeting and 
then only if they held at least £200 nominal value of shares. After the 1920 
government-commissioned Report produced by the Committee, there were no more 
official British investigations into employee share schemes.92
 In the United States, although the total number of employee shares represented 
only 4.26% of the share capital of the 20 large corporations studied by Princeton 
University in 1926, this was still much a more significant figure than anything in the 
UK. 
 
93
 
 
3.2 Investment trusts 
 
Another route to increasing the number of shareholders was the investment trust or 
closed-end fund. These trusts allowed small “investors of moderate means” access to 
a diversified portfolio. In the United Kingdom, the first investment trust units were 
offered to investors in 1868. Each £100 unit represented part ownership of an 
underlying portfolio of eighteen different government and colonial bonds. The issue 
was successful and followed by a rash of so-called “average investment trust” issues. 
By 1875, 18 trusts were listed on the London Stock Exchange. There were further 
booms: between 1887 and 1890, 70 new investment trust companies were floated, 
with a further 44 between 1905 and 1914. They were considered appropriate for the 
“confused investor.” One such trust, launched in 1914, was the so-called “People’s 
Trust.” This was aiming not at investors of moderate means but at the “industrial and 
working classes.” As Powell commented, this meant that such trusts were available to 
                                                 
89 Cheffins, Corporate Ownership, 270. 
90 Daunton, Just Taxes 50, 53, 66. Clay, “The Distribution of Capital in England and Wales, 
Transactions of the Manchester Statistical Society,” 53-80. 
91 The Accountant, 1921. 
92 For more detail, see the Report on Profit-Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in the United Kingdom, 
1920. For further discussion of the Report, see Maltby et al. “The Evidence for ‘Democratisation’.” 
93 Report on Profit-Sharing, 44. Ott, “New Proprietorship,” 70. 
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all who could save.94
 In contrast, the US investment trust market did not develop fully until the mid-
1920s; only 18 trusts were formed prior to 1924. However, by mid-1928, the US 
investment trust market had overtaken that of the UK, with an aggregate capital of 
$1.2 billion compared with an equivalent $1 billion for UK investment trusts. The 
pace quickened as investment trust issuance rose to a peak in 1929 with more than $7 
billion invested in a single year in 675 investment companies of all types, of which 
193 were investment management companies with assets of $2.7 billion.
 The largest boom of all was between 1924 and 1929, with 103 
new investment trusts floated on the stock market.  
95
 US retail brokerages followed in the wake of the mass marketing techniques 
used for customer and employee share plans in the United States. Although initially 
slow to capitalise on the number of potential investors, they did catch up, and even 
used the employee and customer share plans in advertising to increase their customer 
base. In particular, brokers benefited from selling shares in investment trusts, which 
offered an infinite supply of new shares to sell. The number of securities affiliates 
launched by banks grew from 11 in 1920 to 200 in 1929. In 1908, the National City 
Bank had 83 prospective investors on its books; by 1929, the bank’s securities 
affiliate sold around $2 billion of securities to 150,000 investors. By the late 1920s, 
more than 7,000 securities dealers and 30,000 banks competed with each other for 
each new issue. As the supply of industrial and commercial stock began to dry up, 
new investment companies were floated to invest in the common stock of other 
investment trust companies, creating pyramid structures. Bonus shares were paid to 
promoters and management expenses rocketed. The radio was used to promote 
investment through such programmes as Old Counsellor on NBC. Stock prices were 
broadcast daily to “even the most remote localities.”
 
96 Radio programmes, the 
broadcasting of share prices and brokerage marketing campaigns via radio were much 
more important in the US where newspapers could not so easily reach the more 
geographically diffuse US population.97
 Brokerage houses had women’s rooms and banks opened women’s 
departments, staffed by female bank employees. In 1915, one of the first banks 
representing this trend, the Columbia Trust Company of New York, appointed 
Virginia D.H. Furman as “Manager” of its new women’s department. By the early 
1920s, women-run women’s departments had taken off. Women’s departments were 
observed throughout the country, although commentators noted regional variations, 
“with the Mid-west being more supportive than the East, while the South was the 
 
                                                 
94 Powell, “The Democratisation,” 247. Jefferys, Trends, 377. 
95 Rutterford, “Learning,” 167. 
96 Ott, “New Proprietorship,” 70. Meeker, The Work, . 119.  
97 See Ott, Proprietorship, and Traflet, A Nation¸ for more discussion of the use of media in promoting 
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most resistant.”98 A 1928 study by the Investment Research Committee of the 
Financial Advertising Association credited women with buying between 15 and 20% 
of new securities issues.99
 In the UK, there was no major shift from investing in government bonds to 
investing in corporate bonds, as happened in the US, with no employee or customer 
schemes as well as a more laissez faire approach from brokers and the LSE. Nor were 
war bond marketing techniques applied to corporate securities. New issues were still 
marketed in the press and via circulars but there were no major efforts to set up 
customer or employee share schemes. Door to door selling or “hawking” did however 
take place, until banned by the Companies Act 1928.
 
100 But in the main, brokers 
continued to act for an élite group of private clients, with firms such as James Capel 
acting directly or on behalf of bank clients for commission. Regular visits by James 
Capel partners to the bank Coutts in the West End were used to answer private client 
queries and save on correspondence. There was little effort at mass marketing. Clients 
were accepted by the broker rather than the other way round.101
 
 
4. After the Crash of 1929 
 
The Crash of 1929 had a terrible impact on Wall Street. Brokerage houses and banks 
suffered with the almost complete collapse of the investment trust market which had 
been so profitable for them. The number of individual brokerage accounts fell. 
Women were reported to have been more emotional than men at their losses and “on 
the verge of returning to bridge.” Traflet contrasts the ‘masses of women who once 
crowded brokerage desks in the 1920s’ with their virtual disappearance from the 
market in the 1930s and 1940s.102 Wendt, analysing a random sample of 1000 
accounts in a Wall Street brokerage house during 1933 to 1938 found that 278 were 
women, including 102 classified by marital status and the remaining 176 in other 
occupations. Despite appearances, therefore, women were still active investors after 
the Crash, fewer in number than their male counterparts but trading in one brokerage 
house as much as did the men, and professional women were still attracted to stock 
market investment.103
 The number of US employee share plans plummeted. In a survey of employee 
share plans after the Crash, Davis found that the median price of 18 preference shares 
 
                                                 
98 Robertson, “The Principles,” 4-5. 
99 Ott, “New Proprietorship,” 85. 
100 This did not get rid of the problem, which was eventually dealt with under the Prevention of Fraud 
(Investment) Act, 1939, effective 1944. See Morgan and Thomas, The Stock Exchange, 210. 
101 Reed, A History of James Capel, 78-9. 
102 Traflet, “Apple Pie.” 
103 Wendt, The Classification. 
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and 17 common shares which had been the subject of employee plans and active in 
1926 was 98 7/8 in 1926, peaked at 115 in 1929 and fell to 14 7/8 by 1932. Of the 50 
plans which she studied, 31 had been terminated. Some concessions to the dramatic 
price falls in many cases were made by corporations, so that most employees who had 
not bought in the heady years of 1926 to 1928 did not lose out. For example, United 
Cigar Stores allowed employees to cancel their plans, but many were reluctant to 
cancel in case they lost their jobs. Most corporations suspended their plans 
indefinitely although there were six new plans in 1931 and 4 in 1932. The conclusion 
reached by Davis in 1935 was that employee share plans would in future be limited to 
senior executives. Corporations would not dare to put their employees (as opposed to 
their managers) at so much market risk again.104
 US investment trusts also suffered, more so than their UK counterparts, for a 
number of reasons. US trusts had diversified across US equities, rather than the global 
fixed interest portfolios of their UK counterparts. US investment trusts had more 
leverage and more cross-holdings and, with investments valued at market value rather 
than book value, were more vulnerable to a market downturn. In June 1931, the 
Economist reported that the Standard Statistics index of common stocks of 30 leading 
American investment trusts showed a fall of no less than 75% from their peak, 
whereas the Institute of Actuaries index of the shares of 15 leading British investment 
trusts showed a fall from their peak of only 17%. In Britain, in 1933, the worst year of 
the bear market, only seven pre-World War I and one third of post-World War I 
investment trusts passed their dividends.
 
105
 
 In the US, by 1934, nearly 200 investment 
management companies had disappeared, and with them the savings of many small 
investors. 
4.1 Shareholder numbers before and after the Crash 
 
The significant rise in US shareholder numbers during the 1920s attracted attention. 
Both broad brush and more detailed attempts were made to quantify the increase. 
Sears, for example, referred in 1929 to an additional 1 million stockholders in the 
previous five years.106
                                                 
104 Davis, “Employee Stock Ownership.” 
 Warshow, aware of the increase in shareholder numbers in the 
company of which he was Treasurer, National Lead, made the first serious attempt to 
estimate total shareholder numbers in 1924. Means – and later Berle and Means - 
estimated total stockholder numbers at the end of the 1920s, extrapolating from 
Warshow’s 1924 analysis of stockholder registers. Using the same sample of 
companies which appeared on all Warshow’s lists from 1900 onwards, Means 
105 The Economist, 30 June 1931. Balogh and Doblin, Report on Investment Trusts in Great Britain. 
106 Sears, The New Place, 35-6. 
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estimated a figure of 18 million shareholdings of record (whom he called “book 
stockholders”) for 1928, which could be compared with Warshow’s figure of 12 
million for 1920. Berle and Means, using the same Warshow methodology, estimated 
20 million book stockholders for 1929.107 See Table 1. Of the 8 million extra book 
stockholders recorded since 1920, Means estimated that 1 million came from 
customer share plans set up in the intervening years, and a further 800,000 from 
employee share plans. Means’ primary concern was also the diffusion of 
shareholdings; for example, he commented on the switch in holdings from the 
relatively wealthy to the less well off, particularly in the period 1913 to 1921, also a 
factor in the UK. 108
 However, Means also noted that some growth in shareholder numbers might 
have been due to an increase in the number of shares held in individual shareholder 
portfolios. Joseph McCoy, an actuary working in the Treasury department, attempted 
to avoid this shareholdings versus shareholders problem by estimating the number of 
shareholders through the dividend income disclosed in corporate and individual tax 
returns. He estimated 2.4 million individual stockholders in 1924, and 3.3 million by 
1927 – equivalent to 2.1% and 2.8% of the population. He also estimated, in 1927, a 
further 1.3 million individual bondholders.
 
109 However, since not all investors 
completed tax returns, this is likely to be an underestimate of the number of 
shareholders. Berle and Means, using the McCoy approach, estimated “at best, very 
approximate” shareholder numbers to be in the range of 4 to 6 million for 1927 and 4 
to 7 million for 1929. The 1928 estimate is based on 18 million book stockholdings 
and average holdings per portfolio of between 3 and 4.5; the 1929 estimate appears to 
be a pure guess.110
 In the United States, the Crash of 1929 led to a number of investigations into 
what had gone wrong. Interest in how many people had been caught up in the stock 
market was high, in particular whether small investors were to blame for the Crash or 
were victims.
 See Table 2 for a summary of these shareholder estimates in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of the population. 
111
                                                 
107 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation, Appendix H. 
 The Crash also led to a demand, not only for analysis of what had 
gone wrong, but for improved protection of shareholders, small and large, leading to 
108Means, “The Diffusion,” 568-9, 595. Cheffins, Corporate Ownership, 270. 
109 McCoy, “The U.S. Legion of Capitalists,” 559-60, 626-8. McCoy, “Sources of Prosperity,” 643-4, 
702-3. The Fletcher Committee Report on Banking and Currency in 1934 estimated that there were 
only 1.5 million individual stockholders at the height of the boom out of a total population of 126 
million, a low figure compared to all other estimates.109 
110 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation, Appendix K.. 
111 For small investors’ possible role as victims of the Crash, see Traflet, A Nation, 14-15. For their role 
as possible factors in the Crash, see Traflet, A Nation, 21. 
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the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.112 It was 
important to find out who these shareholders were. All estimates agreed that the 
number of shareholders for the early 1930s was higher than at the market peak of 
1929. For example, the Standard Statistics survey of 50 companies published in 
Printers’ Ink found 4,998,383 holdings in 1933 compared with 3,076,379 in 1929.113 
Kimmel later attributed this unexpected rise to two factors: investors switching from 
brokerage to own name accounts – a trend also identified by Sears - and investors 
beginning to buy again when they thought stocks were relatively cheap.114 Bernheim 
and Schneider, editors of The Twentieth Century Fund, for the most part using Berle 
and Means’ methodology and making estimates of growth in numbers from 1927 to 
1932 of shareholders in a sample of 69 companies, estimated 9.5 to11 million 
shareholders in 1931 (8.3% of the population taking the mid-point) and 10 to 12 
million in 1932 (8.8%).115
 Detailed pre-World War II estimate of shareholder numbers came from the 
Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC), set up to investigate the Crash of 
1929 with a remit to examine the concentration of economic power, a recognition that 
shareholder numbers measured diffusion but not necessarily democratisation. It 
estimated shareholder numbers using four methods: the first two were refined 
versions of McCoy’s method, varying in how to account for shares held by 
individuals not included in the tax return data and also for shareholders holding non-
dividend paying stock. The third method used the shareholdings of record method of 
Warshow and Berle and Means, and estimated average securities held per individual 
from a sample of 5,000 Federal income tax returns with assumptions being made for 
those not filing returns or holding non-dividend paying stocks. The fourth estimate 
was obtained from a sample survey by Elmer Roper of the NYSE. The TNEC in all 
cases estimated beneficial shareholdings rather than simply shareholdings of record, 
finding 26 million beneficial shareholdings compared to 24 million shareholdings of 
record for 1937.
  
116
 The four different TNEC methods gave estimates of 6-7, 7-8, 10 and 9 million 
stockholders respectively. Cox takes likely figures to be around 8-9 million 
shareholders at the time of the TNEC estimates in 1937 – equivalent to 6.2-7.0% of 
  
                                                 
112 Other legislation related to the Crash included the Investment Company Act 1940 and the 
Investment Advisers Act 1940. 
113 This takes no account of whether the number of shares in issue for these companies increased over 
the period. 
114 Kimmel, Share Ownership, 129. Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis, which encouraged buying 
of value shares while market prices were low, was first published in 1934. 
115 Bernheim and Schneider, The Securities Markets. 
116 However, although not specified clearly, the TNEC estimates included close companies but does 
attempt to estimate beneficial shareholdings rather than shareholdings of record. For more discussion 
of this topic see Cox, Trends, 43-5. 
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the population − and argues that these figures reflect a rise in stockholder numbers 
which peaked in 1933 followed by a decline to levels of 5 to 6 million – around half 
the numbers in the early 1930s – a decline which lasted until the mid-to-late 1950s.117
 In the UK, the impact of the stock market crash was not as great in the US. 
The London stock market reached 1929 levels again in 1934, whereas the same was 
not true for the New York Stock Exchange until 1954. In the UK during 1935 and 
1936, for example, there were 209 initial public offerings worth £97.7 million 
compared with 287 worth £96.7 million for 1928 and 1929.
 
118 There was no 
inquisition into the causes of the Crash, and no attempted estimates of shareholder 
numbers until after World War II. It is clear, though, that by this stage there were 
many more US companies with large numbers of shareholders than in the UK. For 
example, a post-World War II backward-looking survey by Sargant Florence of 44 
companies in 1936 (and still in existence in 1951) found 2 companies in 1936 with 
more than 10,000 shareholders and an average (median) number of shareholders of 
19,644 (10,250). By comparison, a Standard Statistics survey of 50 US corporations, 
published in 1933, at the peak of the shareholder boom, found 13 with more than 
100,000 shareholders and an average (median) of 99,968 (59,131).119
 An informal survey in 1929 by The Economist, of 18 large and medium-sized 
UK companies, found that one company had more than 100,000 shareholders and that 
the average (median) number of shareholders was 27,944 (19,500). The main purpose 
of The Economist survey, though, was to ascertain the impact of the broad distribution 
of shareholdings - ‘the scattered body of small holders’ - on corporate control. They 
found that over one third of shareholders owned less than £100 nominal of shares, and 
over 85% less than £500. Their concern was that such small holdings, probably held 
as part of a portfolio, led to ‘inertia’ and ‘abuse’, citing examples of companies where 
changes in capital structure had not been challenged by shareholders, despite the 
consequence of apathy being a reduction in voting rights for minority shareholders.
 
120
 
 
5. Post World War II 
 
5.1 Customer relations 
 
In the US, the National Industrial Conference Board conducted a questionnaire survey 
on shareholder relations in 1950; 217 companies replied, including 99 industrials, 63 
utilities and railroads, 37 banks and investment companies, and 18 insurance 
                                                 
117 Cox, Trends, 31. See also Cox’s Table 2 on page 33. 
118 Chambers, “Financial Dependence,” 28. 
119 The Economist, “Shareholders and Control,” 30 March 1929, 691. Sargant Florence, The Logic, 
Appendix. Printers’ Ink, 25 October 1934. 
120 The Economist, March 30 1929, 692. 
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companies. The aim behind the survey was to explore whether stockholders could be 
grouped into unions as were employees into trade unions, and whether stockholder 
associations could be used to good effect to lobby for such things as lower taxes on 
dividends via the Investors’ League. Many firms had highly developed stockholder 
relations departments – AT&T’s had a staff of 200 – and used their shareholder base 
to create customer loyalty and an effective lobbying group. Scott Paper Company sent 
a welcome letter to all new stockholders which included a gift package of their 
principal products. Borden Company asked new stockholders to complete a 
descriptive questionnaire. They were able to ascertain that more than 58% of their 
stockholders were women, and that the most common stockholding was from 10 to 24 
shares. They found that one third of their shareholders derived very little income from 
stocks and bonds and another third derived less than one third of their income from 
this source, so that the majority of their shareholders had some form of occupation. Of 
their total of 52,000 shareholders, over half responded to offers of free coffee, and 
later, cheese. 
 Many of the companies responding to the questionnaire survey ensured that 
shareholder meetings included presentations and product displays which would appeal 
to the individual shareholder. General Mills had this down to a fine art. At a series of 
regional shareholder meetings, a motion picture was shown, employees and managers 
were in attendance to answer questions, sampling of Betty Crockers split pea soup 
proved popular and there were demonstrations of Tru-Heat irons by local home 
appliance representatives. Special chiffon cakes were presented to various 
stockholders. One went to the lady whose birthday fell on the birthday of General 
Mills, one to the lady stockholder who had held her stock the longest, one to the lady 
who had travelled furthest for the meeting, and finally one to the longest serving 
female employee. Such meetings for GM dated back to 1939 (although suspended 
during the War), with over one third of stockholders in areas visited attending, “with 
about equal representation of men and women owners.”121
 There is no equivalent market research on UK shareholders and how they were 
used if at all to promote the goods of the companies in which they invested. American 
firms asked their shareholders whether they wanted the annual report in black and 
white or in colour, whether they wanted more photographs or less. Anecdotal 
evidence is provided for the UK by a 1960 advert, in The Economist, for Simon-
Carves, an engineering company. The advert is inreply to a lady shareholder who had 
 This emphasis on 
marketing to shareholders marks a reversal of the attitude of US corporations to their 
shareholders in the 1920s. At that time, corporations targeted customers to become 
shareholders. By the 1950s, they were targeting shareholders to become customers. 
                                                 
121 Watson, “Stockholder Relations.” 
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written in to complain to the Secretary of Simon-Carves: “You build such hideous 
plants, Don’t send me any more annual reports because I hate the pictures." The 
advert goes on to explain how essential the company’s products are to her cutlery, 
radio, electric lighting, to which "our hideous plants contribute in more ways than 
space allows us to mention."122
 
 
[FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE] 
 
5.2 Shareholder numbers post World War II 
 
Concern about shareholder numbers in the United Kingdom after World War II was 
linked to two issues: nationalisation of major British industries, including coal, 
utilities and transport, and a resurgence of the labour capital debate. On the former 
issue, Hargreaves Parkinson had long championed the small investor. In his 1930 
book entitled The Small Investor, he had cited the 1929 survey in The Economist 
which showed that average holdings in major British industrial companies were often 
£300 or less. He pointed out that large numbers of orders of securities for £25 to £100 
were forwarded day by day to London stockbrokers’ offices from bank branches all 
over the country.123 He then wrote a series of articles for the Financial News entitled 
“Who owns the Railways?” published in 1944. He sampled every tenth shareholder in 
each of the four remaining railway companies and found 98% of shareholdings were 
for a nominal value of £5,000 or less, with more than half the dividend warrants – 
after tax – for £10 or less.124
                                                 
122 The Economist, January 1960, 312. 
 In 1951, he published Ownership of Industry, using 1944 
and 1945 share registers – as being the latest available – and explored the ownership 
of the top 30 companies by market capitalisation included in the FT30 share index. 
Looking at both ordinary and preference shares, totalling £347 million in nominal 
value, he found a total of 1,112,970 shareholdings with 286,330 preference 
shareholders having an average nominal holding of £388, and 826,640 ordinary 
shareholders having an average nominal holding of £286. Parkinson also analysed the 
railway, coal and electricity companies and found, for a capital of £850 million, a 
total of 1,047,780 shareholdings, with 618,489 preference shareholders having an 
average nominal holding of £883, and 429,291 ordinary shareholders having an 
average nominal holding of £758. Parkinson’s concern was the distribution of 
ownership and not the characteristics of investors, except whether they were 
123 Parkinson, The Small Investor, 78. 
124 The British (not Irish) railway companies were consolidated into four companies in 1923. The 
Engineer, “August: The Railways Act, 1921”, September 21, 1921, 231. 
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“small.”125 His anti-nationalisation view was that ownership could not be more 
democratic if the companies concerned were indeed nationalised.126 He argued that 
having large numbers of small shareholders empowered medium-sized shareholders 
to influence corporate governance. Sargant Florence viewed this as misguided. Major 
diffusion of shareholding led, he asserted, to a ‘resolute minority’ of shareholders 
holding as little as 10% of voting capital could easily take advantage of an ‘indifferent 
majority’.127 Parkinson lost his case against nationalisation, with £2bn of company 
capital in rail, utilities and coal being replaced by government or government-
guaranteed post World War II.128
 The first formal estimate of the number of UK shareholders was by Ellinger 
and Carter, and their results were published in 1949 in the Financial Times. As the 
authors argued, ‘It is curious, but no one hitherto has ever inquired how many 
investors there are.’
 
129 As did Parkinson, they counted shareholdings in the FT30 
share index – this time using 1941 registers.130 The authors found total ordinary 
shareholdings of 815,977, which compares closely with Parkinson’s estimate of 
826,640. However, they went further, trying to estimate not shareholdings but 
shareholders. By comparing duplication of holdings between shareholders in a set of 
40 companies chosen to be of different sizes and industries, and shareholders in two 
very widely held companies, the authors estimated that were in total over 10 million 
shareholdings but only 1.25 million shareholders. The number of shareholders was 
surprisingly similar to more ad hoc estimates made much earlier in the century (see 
Table 2) and the percentage of the population holding shares was 2.6%, hardly higher 
than in 1914. The average number of holdings, though, was assumed to be 8, rather 
higher than the 4.5 estimate for the early1900s. Indeed, Ellinger and Carter argued 
that investors had “turned themselves into investment trusts.”131 They also noted that 
47% of the holders were male, 40% female, 8% joint holders and 5 per cent charities, 
nominees, and corporate. Women were more important investors in certain types of 
companies: “which are household names or which are reputed to be very safe, and 
low in, for example, mining concerns. The female investor is less venturesome than 
the male.”132
                                                 
125 Parkinson, “Who Owns the Railways”; Parkinson, Ownership of Industry, 1951; Parkinson, “Who 
Owns the Railways?,” 14, 61. 
 As Sargant Florence commented, “to judge from British evidence, 
nearly half of them [shareholders] are women, many of them shy (without reason) of 
126 Ellinger and Carter, “The Owners of Industry,” 6. 
127 Sargant Florence, The Logic of Business and Industry, 195. 
128 Morgan and Thomas, The Stock Exchange, 198. 
129 Ellinger and Carter, “The Anatomy”, Financial Times, March 1, 1949, 2. 
130 Sargant Florence, The Logic of Business and Industry, 156. 
131 Ellinger and Carter, “The Owners of Industry”; Financial Times, February 28, 1949, 4. 
132 Ellinger and Carter, “How many Investors are There?”, Financial Times, 2 March, 1949, 4. 
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business.”133
 
 However, Ellinger and Carter did not find evidence of the 
“democratisation of investment,” rather the opposite, describing the investor: 
to be found in retirement in the pleasanter climes of Southern and South-Western 
England and North Wales. This is the section of the public reviled by class haters, 
discriminated against fiscally, and given inadequate compensation on 
nationalisation.134
 
 
They showed, as had The Economist in 1929 and Hargreaves Parkinson in 1944, that 
most investors had holdings of £500 or less, making them vulnerable to 
nationalisation. At the time of the Financial Times survey, railway nationalisation had 
already taken place, with more to come. Such investors, argued Ellinger and Carter, 
were wide open to the one by one tactics of government: ‘their Railway Stocks are 
taken. Well, they still have their Electricity Stocks and more. Then their Electricity 
stocks go, but there is still Steel. After Steel, there will be Chemicals, Breweries, 
Insurance and others.’135
 After nationalisation, the debate in the UK as to the number of shareholders 
continued, this time as part of the labour capital divide. It rose to a crescendo in the 
late 1950s after the market had tripled in value between 1948 and 1957, and after a 
succession of good years for company profits and dividends. The growth in the 
industrial and commercial sector more than compensated for the loss of company 
securities through nationalisation. Between 1946 and 1962, the nominal value of 
shares in that sector rose from £1,629 million to £5,930 million.
  
136 In fact, companies 
appeared to make large profits partly because dividends were declared as a percentage 
of nominal and not market value. Inflation after World War II had also led 
governments to impose wage controls on labour and, encouraged by the trade unions, 
dividend controls on share-owning capitalists.137
 
 A pamphlet entitled The Poor Man’s 
Guide to the Stock Exchange, published by the Labour Research Department, was 
sceptical of the wider ownership statistics: 
A vigorous attempt is now being made to persuade everyone to believe that British 
industry is really owned by a mass of small investors. Some of the biggest companies 
have published lists of their shareholders – details I mean – for example, in 1958 
Imperial Chemical Industries had 261,663 shareholders with an average holding of 
                                                 
133 Sargant Florence, The Logic, 179. 
134 Ellinger and Carter, “How Many Investors are There?”, Financial Times, 2 March, 1949, 4. 
135 Ellinger and Carter, “The Owners of Industry,” 6. 
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£551 and 93,000 shareholders in Woolworth, F.W. & Co. with an average of £172 
each.138
 
 
The number and characteristics of shareholders had again become a political issue. In 
1958, the president of Aims for Industry, Sir Ian Lyle, announced that Tate & Lyle 
and 20 other companies would set up shops to sell shares at their production sites to 
attract worker shareholders. The Wider Share Ownership Council, supported by a 
number of Conservative MPs, was also lobbying for bearer shares – to avoid onerous 
stamp duty on small trades. However, the threat of further nationalisations was clearly 
a factor behind the campaign. The Chairman of Rugby Portland Cement, in his annual 
general meeting speech in 1960, followed the Hargreaves Parkinson line that wider 
share ownership was a superior form of nationalisation, with public ownership of 
shares giving people access to retained profits as well as dividends.139
 In the United States, post World-War II, the market did not recover its 1929 
value until 1954, but this was twice the value of 1945. Attempts to revive employee 
share plans had proved unsuccessful. In a 1953 report, the National Industrial 
Conference Board found only 68 formal plans for selling shares to employees of 
which only 28 were active. All but two were for common stock whereas 1920s 
schemes had been evenly split between preference and common stocks. AT&T 
revived its scheme, closed in 1929, in 1947 and in 1949 International Harvester 
revived the scheme it had opened in 1930 and closed in 1931. The author of the report 
was gloomy on further growth in the sector. She believed that companies had been 
burned by having to compensate employees for losses incurred after the 1929 crash 
and, although they saw such plans as helping to shield employees from rising 
inflation, they would stick to senior executive plans in the future.
 
140
 However, the New York Stock Exchange, suffering from poor business since 
the 1930s, was keen to encourage new customers for its members. Another reason 
was to provide a capitalist riposte to the communist threat of the Cold War.
 
141 But, 
before beginning a campaign to attract more individuals to invest in the American 
economy, the NYSE felt the need to discover who the existing investors were and 
how many of them there were.142
                                                 
138 Labour Research Department, 1959 citing research by Gordon Cummings, published in The Times, 
“How Many Small Shareholders?,” November 13 1958, 18. 
 Since there had been no investigations into 
shareholder numbers since 1937, in 1952 the NYSE commissioned Kimmel of the 
Brookings Institution to conduct a detailed survey of share ownership, of how many 
investors in publicly owned companies there were, who they were and where they 
139 The Times, November 13, 1958, 18; The Times, April 25, 1960, 18. 
140 Bower, Stock Ownership Plans for Workers, 5-7. 
141 Traflet, A Nation, 11, 68-9. 
142 Traflet, A Nation, 74. 
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lived. This involved asking for information on shareholdings in 5,002 corporations – 
those listed on the twenty organized stock exchanges (including the NYSE) and the 
New York Curb Exchange as well as unlisted banks, investment and other 
companies.143 One in ten shareholdings was sampled from information provided on 
3,954 share issues, representing around 25% of all publicly owned stocks as listed in 
Moody’s Manual.144 This yielded 20.3 million shareholdings of record (from 25.2 
beneficial shareholdings), which Kimmel estimated implied a total of 30.3 million 
shareholdings of record for all stock issues which had a significant public interest.145 
However, the number of shareholders – rather than shareholdings - was estimated by 
interviewing a sample of one in ten 5000 family spending units (equivalent to 15,552 
people) and asking how many individuals in each household were shareholders. This 
yielded an estimate of 6.49 million adult individual shareholders in 1951, equivalent 
to only 4.2% of the population, a 50% drop from the early 1930s. The average number 
of share issues held by each investor was 4.1.146
 After the euphoric estimates of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Brookings 
Report was a disappointment to the NYSE, showing half the number of shareholders 
expected.
 This was the first serious estimate of 
shareholder numbers in the US since the TNEC investigation, but the Brookings 
Report estimates was more comprehensive, detailed and more accurate than those 
produced by the TNEC. 
147 But the big news from the definitive Kimmel survey was that there were 
almost as many women investors as men, and that they had slightly more holdings 
than men. The NYSE had no clear idea as to why this was so, speculating that wives 
had inherited shares from their husbands or that they held shares separately for tax 
reasons.148 “But, whatever the reason, this fact was clear.”149 32% of investors were 
housewives, the largest socio-economic group. And there was little evidence of 
‘democratisation’: 69% of shareholders were housewives or professionals.150
 The relatively low stockholder numbers in the Brookings Institution report led 
the NYSE to initiate a major advertising campaign, aimed at individual investors and 
called Own Your Own Share of American Business, which ran from 1954 to 1969. 
 
                                                 
143 The total of 5,002 was made up of 1,074 corporations with shares listed on the NYSE, 577 on the 
New York Curb Exchange, 673 on the other 19 organised stock exchanges, 373 unlisted banks, 149 
unlisted investment companies, and 2,147 other unlisted companies. Kimmel, Stock Ownership, 4-5. 
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This, aided by a series of stock splits which made round lots affordable for small 
investors, had a dramatic effect on stockholder numbers. These went from 6.5 million 
in 1952 (4.2% of the population) to 12.5 million in 1959, 20 million in 1965 and 30 
million (14.6% of the population) in 1970. As a percentage of the population, 
individual shareholders overtook the 8% peak in the 1930s by 1960. In absolute 
terms, by 1970, there were three times as many direct individual shareholders as there 
had been in 1929. But one major difference was that these modern investors bought 
and held, rather than traded on margin. Turnover was only 13% in 1952 compared 
with 100% or more in 1929.151
 In the UK, there were no more formal surveys of shareholder numbers until 
1965, when the Stock Exchange began estimating the shareholder population. 
However, a Labour Party publication cited an Inland Revenue survey of incomes over 
£135 per annum in 1949/50 and found the number “enjoying” interest and dividends 
was no larger than 1.5 million or 3.0% of the population.
 
152 In a 1958 book entitled 
The Challenge of Employee Shareholding: How to Close the Gap between Capital 
and Labour, Copeman cited MacRae’s estimates of the total number of shareholders 
being between 1.1 to 1.35 million in total (2.1% to 2.6% of the population), but this 
included holders of fixed interest government debt and nationalisation securities.153 
The number of shareholders had again become a political issue by remaining 
steadfastly at 2 to 3% of the population, no higher than in 1914. As markets rose in 
the UK as in the US, so shareholder numbers rose. A Gallup poll in 1960 estimated 
that there were then 3.1 million shareholders (5.9% of the population). Two Stock 
Exchange surveys in 1965 and 1968 estimated the shareholder population in the UK 
to be 1.8 million in 1965 and 2.3 million in 1968 (3.3% and 4.1% respectively).154 It 
was not until the arrival of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979, and her 
programme of privatisation, that direct shareholder numbers in the UK began to 
approach post-war US levels. Until that time, the shareholding population remained 
static, adding shares to existing portfolios. Vernon, writing in 1973, found, from a 
sample survey of an unnamed “blue chip” company with more than 100,000 
individual shareholders, that 52% of respondents held more than 4 securities in their 
portfolios. The Brookings Report had found, from a much larger sample, that 80% of 
respondents in the US held only 1 to 4 securities. In the US, the average number of 
holdings was 4.1; the median for the small UK sample was 21.155
                                                 
151 Traflet, “Apple Pie,” 11; Cox, Trends, 3. Traflet, A Nation, 153. 
 The average 
152 “The Poor Man’s Guide.” It also reported that in 1955-6, “a mere” 19,000 surtax payers (income 
above £2,000 per annum) received 41% of the total investment income of surtax payers. 
153 Labour Research Department, The Poor Man’s Guide; Copeman, The Challenge, 39-40. 
154 Cited in Vernon, Middleton and Harper, Who Owns, 18; London Stock Exchange Fact Books, 1965 
and 1968. 
155 Vernon, Middleton, and Harper, Who Owns, 104; Kimmel, Stock Ownership, 110, 127. 
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individual shareholding in the UK, in value terms, was also smaller: £860 in the UK 
in 1963 ($2,804) compared with $6,500 in the US in 1952.156
 The NYSE may not have expected there to be more women investors than 
men, but Kimmel in the Brookings Report, is candid on this point. He found the fact 
that there were 7.03 million male stockholdings of record as opposed to 7.62 million 
female stockholdings of record “not unexpected” and argued that a partial explanation 
for female dominance was the AT&T stockholder register. This single register 
accounted for one half of the “excess” of women in the figures. For preference shares, 
there was an even greater female dominance: 543,800 male and 812,100 female 
shareholdings of record. The average value of male and female holdings was $4,290 
for men and $3,558 for women for ordinary shares and $2,973 for men and $2,550 for 
women for preference shares.
 UK investor portfolios 
still included more securities held in smaller amounts than did their US counterparts. 
157
 
 So, although the NYSE did not expect female 
dominance, it was common knowledge to others. Good Housekeeping had already 
referred to “what a large shareholder she is” in the 1920s. In 1948, Elizabeth Kidd, in 
the foreword to her book, Women Never Go Broke, could write: 
With so much of the nation’s wealth falling, by default and demise, into the dainty 
little fingers of females, this could be serious. In fact it is. Visualize for yourself 80% 
of the private life insurance, 70% of estates, 50% of the privately owned stock of 
corporations, 48% of railway and utility holdings, 40% of the nation’s homes, 74% of 
suburban homes, 66% of mutual savings bank accounts, to say nothing of about 104 
½ billion dollars’ annual spending money, all held in this fragile but febrile grasp.158
 
 
Also, post-World War II, brokers and companies were well aware of their female 
investor base. In 1950, three years before the NYSE even started its Own Your Share 
in American Business marketing campaign, Merrill Lynch held ladies-only 
investment seminars in 62 different cities, attracting an audience of over 30,000 
women.159
 In the US, as shareholder numbers and stock market prices rose, there was 
some attempt by US corporations to revive the ‘people’s capitalism’ argument, as 
happened in the UK. This was helped be detailed surveys produced after the 
Brookings Report in the 1950s and 1960s.
 Companies, particularly those selling consumer products, recognised that 
women shareholders were a positive attribute.  
160
                                                 
156 Vernon, Middleton and Harper, Who Owns, 16; Kimmel, Stock Ownership, 13-14. 
 AT&T had, by mid-twentieth century, 
157 Kimmel, Stock Ownership, 16-17. 
158 Kidd, Women Never Go Broke, Foreword. 
159 Traflet, A Nation, 155. 
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over 1 million shareholders and 20,000 investors attending the AGM.161Somehow, 
with numbers of shareholders, the world must be a better, more democratic place. US 
corporations began to peddle this line in their advertisements, as they had done in the 
1920s. General Electric stated: "People’s Capitalism: the 376,000 owners with 
savings invested in General Electric are typical of America, where nearly every 
citizen is a capitalist."162 A.D.H. Kaplan wrote: “The number of stockholders now 
equals or exceeds the number of employees in many large American corporations. 
The effect of prevailing tax rates on inheritance and income is toward progressive 
diffusion of the personal capital holdings in American corporations.”163 High tax rates 
post-World War II (as post-World War I) had driven high income earners to tax-
exempt securities, requiring lower taxed individuals to take their place. However, this 
diffusion did not lead to shareholder control, as Perlo demonstrated.164 Institutional 
investors were the major acquirers of new issues from the 1950s onwards, on both 
sides of the Atlantic.165
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has explored the trends in – and contemporary estimates of the extent of – 
‘democratisation’ and ‘diffusion’ of shareholding from the late nineteenth century to 
1970 in both the UK and the US. It has identified three key periods for this process: 
pre-World War I, between the Wars, and post-World War II. Before World War I, 
shareholdings in the UK were more diffuse for a larger number of quoted companies, 
helped by marketing, new issue booms, and securities suited to small investors. As a 
result, the UK had more individual shareholders as a percentage of the population 
than did the US on the cusp of World War I. There were no formal attempts to 
quantify shareholder numbers at the time, though company chairmen and periodicals 
noted the upward trend and comparisons of similar-sized samples of UK and US 
companies’ shareholder numbers show a larger UK shareholder base as a percentage 
of the population. 
 After World War I, the US overtook the UK in shareholder numbers, peaking 
in 1932 at a contemporary estimate of 10 million (8% of the population) fuelled by an 
increase in customer and employee shareholders, the switch of the wealthy after 
World War I towards tax-exempt securities, marketing strategies linked to sales 
techniques which had proved successful with Liberty Bonds, and also to the rise of 
                                                 
161 Rutterford, “The Shareholder Voice,” 134. 
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securities houses marketing shares in investment trusts. Numerous attempts were 
made to measure the extent of this ‘democratisation’ of the 1920s with differing and 
flawed methodologies which nevertheless all pointed to US shareholder numbers 
peaking in the early 1930s. In the late 1930s, the US Temporary National Economic 
Committee tried four different methods to quantify the importance of small investors 
in corporate America, in order to better regulate the investment industry. The US 
democratisation process suffered a reversal from the early1930s onwards, falling to 
around 4% of the population by the 1950s, when the NYSE sponsored a detailed and 
accurate study of how many investors there actually were. A rising stock market – the 
market reached its 1929 level in 1954 and carried on rising - and a very successful 
NYSE-led campaign saw shareholder numbers increasing rapidly thereafter, equalling 
1933 levels by the 1960s and reaching 30 million − 15% of the population – by 1970. 
From the 1960s onwards, there were frequent surveys of stockholder numbers and 
characteristics, by the NYSE to measure progress and by companies themselves in 
order better understand their shareholder base. 
 In the UK, after World War I, companies did not feel obliged to encourage 
customers and employees to invest to the same extent as the US, and share investment 
remained the domain of the privileged few. The London Stock Exchange and 
stockbrokers did not aggressively market securities investment. While there was no 
major boom and bust in the 1920s in the UK, forced sales of dollar securities during 
World War I, nationalisations of overseas companies whose shares were listed on the 
London Stock Exchange between the wars and nationalisations (as a form of 
government-led financial repression) after World War II reduced the size of the stock 
market by as much as one third, significantly reducing the potential size of the 
investor population. It was in the face of the major nationalisation programme post-
World War II that the first formal attempt at measuring shareholder numbers was 
conducted in 1949, and estimates of average shareholding size were calculated in 
order to promote share ownership by all as an alternative to nationalisation. There was 
no equivalent financial repression in the US. Even after a bull run in the 1950s and 
1960s and a half-hearted Wider Share Ownership campaign, UK direct shareholder 
numbers never exceeded 2 to 3 million − at most 4 to 5 per cent of the population by 
1970. A smaller élite number of UK investors bought and held more shares in smaller 
amounts than did their US counterparts. It was not until the election of Margaret 
Thatcher in 1979 and the introduction of her privatisation programme that shareholder 
numbers (in percentage terms) reached US levels. 
 This comparative study of the democratisation patterns in the UK and the US 
has also allowed us to discuss important factors going beyond the current literature 
that emphasizes common law origins and real income growth. Both countries 
experienced shareholder diffusion – in terms of the size of the investor population - 
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although the Crash of 1929 severely impacted US shareholder numbers from the early 
1930s to the late 1950s. However, the more aggressive marketing strategies of US 
companies and the NYSE, highlighted by Ott and Traflet, increased shareholder 
numbers in the US in the 1920s and after the 1950s. In the US, the post World War II 
anti-communist perspective perfectly suited the ‘small capitalist’ marketing stance of 
the NYSE. In the UK, shareholder numbers were depressed by the lack of aggressive 
marketing campaigns of companies (until the 1960s), stockbrokers, and the LSE, and 
also by financial repression, in particular, the nationalisations of the 1940s and 1950s.
 However, there are interesting similarities. Corporate governance and 
regulation were affected on both sides of the Atlantic by increasing numbers of 
investors. Substantially increased shareholder regulation in the US was introduced 
after small investors suffered in the Crash of 1929, and shareholder numbers were 
used as marketing tools for companies; as political ammunition against the break-up 
of the major US utilities, such as AT&T; and in the anti-nationalisation campaign in 
the UK during and after WWII. Another similarity was the rise in importance of 
female investors. The Anglo Saxon legal framework can perhaps explain the 
importance of women as investors on both sides of the Atlantic, enfranchised 
throughout this period to buy shares in their own names, attend and vote at Annual 
General meetings. There are other factors, though, to do with unearned income, 
inheritance, and tax laws. And yet, it is only towards the end of this period that the 
importance of women in the shareholding population became clear, highlighted in the 
Kimmel Report in the US in the 1950s and by Edlinger and Carter in the UK in the 
1940s. Shareholder diffusion can partly be explained by the increasing importance of 
women investors. 
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Table 1 
Warshow and related estimates of US shareholdings 
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Table 2 
Estimates of US and UK shareholders, numbers and as % of total population. 
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Figure 1 
Joan of Arc marketing literature encouraging women to invest in government 
securities during World War I 
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Figure 2 
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